How To Be A Good Scientist - Hermes J. Pappas

How To Be A Good Scientist
the irony of abnegation
Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
School of Information and Communication Technology
Hermes J. Pappas
Abstract
Many claim that science is the ultimate achievement of
humanity: an objective, absolute way of determining facts
and accumulating knowledge; beyond superstition,
simple-mindedness and blind faith, science is the ultimate
authority on knowledge. This paper discusses this view
and examines science, its value, the way to practice it,
and arrives to a few (possibly) surprising conclusions that
are drawn from that examination.
Introduction
Rational thought. Experimentation. Scientific research. All respected practices, accepted
without question by society, referred to by the media as an ultimate, absolute source of
knowledge accumulation and result production. Scientists nowadays possess a similar amount
of authority and command a similar amount of respect (reverence, even) to the clergy back in
the middle ages.
Supposedly, the main idea of evolution as far as intellectual and general progress is
concerned is self-criticism, deeper reflection and the re-evaluation of standards, as well as the
objective, pragmatic recognition of the proper time to make changes and redefine methods,
rules and systems. This, however, does not seem to be the case with science and the scientific
community as a whole anymore. Both scientists themselves and the “outsiders”, the spectators
of society, recognize that science has become rigid, unforgiving and absolutist.
This paper attempts to take a step back in order to examine the big, complex painting that is
science for what it truly is. It discusses an alternative approach to the standards of scientific
thinking, and suggests a few ways to maintain objectivity and encourage scientific progress
while getting rid of the rigidity and staleness of the establishment science has become today.
The views in this paper are the writer’s own and are neither associated with nor reflect KTH’s
views on any of the matters discussed. Seeing as this is a philosophical approach to this issue, a
more subjective tone is used when expressing personal opinion and an effort is made to
consistently distinguish between intended meaning, objective facts and subjective analysis.
Science, Objectivity and Truth
In order to begin a philosophical discussion about words like science, objectivity, truth and
other abstract concepts such as these, one must establish a meaning for them upon which one’s
argument is based.
Attempting to establish as objective a definition as possible for the concepts about to be
analyzed, English dictionary definitions (“science”, “objective” and “true”) will be utilized and
discussed.
science ¦ sīəns¦
noun
the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and
natural world through observation and experiment : the world of science and technology.
• a particular area of this : veterinary science | the agricultural sciences.
• a systematically organized body of knowledge on a particular subject : the science of criminology.
• archaic knowledge of any kind.
Given the main definition, science is about method, observation and experiment. It also
mainly deals with the examination of the physical and natural world. The secondary definition
is a broader one, claiming that any “systematically organized body of knowledge” can be
called a science. Finally, one can see that the archaic use of the word was a synonym to
knowledge of any kind.
objective ¦əb jektiv¦
adjective
1 (of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts :
historians try to be objective and impartial. Contrasted with subjective .
• not dependent on the mind for existence; actual : a matter of objective fact.
From this one can deduce that objectivity is about the absence of bias in any decision or
endeavor. It is all about “representing facts”, as they are. The second way this is expressed is
that something is objective if it is “not dependent on the mind for existence”. This, to me, is
quite the paradox, but this will be discussed later on.
true
В¦troЕЌВ¦
adjective ( truer , truest )
1 in accordance with fact or reality : a true story | of course it's true | that is not true of the people I am talking about.
• [ attrib. ] rightly or strictly so called; genuine : people are still willing to pay for true craftsmanship | we believe in true love.
• [ attrib. ] real or actual : he has guessed my true intentions.
• said when conceding a point in argument or discussion : true, it faced north, but you got used to that.
2 accurate or exact : it was a true depiction.
• (of a note) exactly in tune.
• (of a compass bearing) measured relative to true north : steer 085 degrees true.
• correctly positioned, balanced, or aligned; upright or level.
3 loyal or faithful : he was a true friend.
• [ predic. ] ( true to) accurately conforming to (a standard or expectation); faithful to : this entirely new production remains true
to the essence of Lorca's play.
4 chiefly archaic honest : we appeal to all good men and true to rally to us.
One can see the concepts of “fact” and “actual” in the definition for something that is “true”,
just like in “objective”. The main usage of the word “true” is one that seems, indeed,
intertwined with “objective”. When examining the rest of the modern definitions, it is obvious
the meaning becomes a bit more loose and accommodating, with words like “accurate” and
“faithful”. Finally, examining the archaic usage of the word, it equates “true” to “honest”. This I
find very interesting and will also revisit at a later point in this paper.
Having discussed and examined the definitions of these three concepts, I will begin by
describing Popper’s views on science, falsification and objectivity and commenting on them.
Karl Popper, the Austrian/British scientist and philosopher of science, made some very bold
and absolute statements about what constitutes true science in his paper “Science: Conjectures
and Refutations”. These statements were met with criticism and attacks from several
philosophers of science, who were quick to point out that Popper is idealistic and absolutist.
Popper’s main point is that the true test of a scientific theory is the risk it involves, how much it
can potentially be proven wrong. The following list and conclusive sentence is taken straight
from the paper in question:
“...These considerations led me in the winter of 1919-20 to conclusions which I may
now reformulate as follows.
1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look
for confirmations.
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to
say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event
which was incompatible with the theory-an event which would have refuted the
theory.
3. Every К»goodКј scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The
more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.
Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is
falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable,
more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test
of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but
unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of
К»corroborating evidenceКј.)
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their
admirers-for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or bey reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a
procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the
price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such
a rescuing operation as a К»conventionalist twistКј or a К»conventionalist stratagemКј.)
One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory
is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”
- Karl Popper [01]
From these rules of his, one can see that Popper feels strongly about trying to disprove one’s
own theory, doubting one’s own results, one’s judgement, in order to be absolutely certain
about one’s theory or formulation. My interpretation of this is that Popper is an advocate of
distancing oneself from one’s own work, denying oneself the satisfaction of self-confirmation, in
order to maintain as much objectivity as possible. In this sense, I believe it is absurd to call
Popper an absolutist, as he seems to strive for objectivity, not credit or recognition for a theory
that’s untested. Attempting to distill this into a simple phrase, Popper subscribes to a behavior in
which you stop saying “yes”. Popper is mainly talking about the personal sort of abnegation,
but this could be interpreted in a broader sense. I urge the reader to bear this in mind as I make
the link to Feyerabend’s theory later on.
Postmodernism and metanarratives
As stated in the introduction, science, and everything it entails and encompasses has come
to be revered and respected in an absolute way by the majority of humanity, especially those
that are either great admirers of scientific practice or engage in research themselves. It has
become an authority that reigns supreme over our world, something no one really thinks to
question or challenge. It is thus worthwhile to examine if it has become a metanarrative.
A metanarrative is, as the “meta” part implies, a narrative about a narrative. It is a story
created to justify another story, and so forth. The more these narratives distance themselves from
the truth, and the more ingrained they become in our everyday lives and into society as a
whole, the more their power increases; the more their message goes unquestioned, their
accuracy undisputed.
At this point I believe it is appropriate to introduce the concept of Postmodernism, via JeanFrançois Lyotard’s explanations and views; the French author is one of the postmodern
philosophers of great renown and has communicated the concept of postmodernism and its
effect on humanity in a very effective manner.
He opens his book, “The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge”, thusly:
“The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed
societies. I have decided to use the word postmodern to describe that condition.
The word is in current use on the American continent among sociologists and
critics; it designates the state of our culture following the transformations which,
since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science,
literature, and the arts. The present study will place these transformations in the
context of the crisis of narratives.
Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of
science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the extent that science
does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is
obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game.
...
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward
metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the
sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. ”
- Jean François Lyotard [02]
Within Lyotard’s statements one can see a strong contradiction between what science
professes to be or strive for, and what it actually practices. In this way a strong breach of the
principle of objectivity science so proudly subscribes itself to is apparent. This is a sort of
recursive phenomenon, in which the birth of this incredulity affects its creator; consumes it
even, in the minds of the skeptic.
It is at this point that I will move on to Feyerabend and his disdain for method, while
proposing a grand escape from the metanarrative that is science.
Escaping the metanarrative
Paul Feyerabend, an Austrian author and professor, has been called an anarchist not only by
his close friend and fellow philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, but by many others who either
participate in or observe and study the field. He himself says he has “no objection to putting on
the anarchist's mask” [03] in the Preface of “Against Method”. These words are important and
absolutely true, as Feyerabend’s thought is anything but chaotic. Like Antero Kärki - a colleague
of mine - said while discussing this, “Sometimes not choosing a method is a method in itself”.
Feyerabend’s “anarchic” way of thinking and propositions are the main driving force behind
this paper, as well the spotlight that emphasizes the irony of abnegation presented in it.
“In a democracy, scientific institutions, research programmes and suggestions must
therefore be subjected to public control, there must be a separation of state and
science just as there is a separation between state and religious institutions, and
science should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only
road to truth and reality.”
- Paul Feyerabend [03]
One can see Feyerabend is addressing the (peculiar, in my opinion) reverence science
dictates by comparing it to religious institutions and proposing a similar separation between the
two aforementioned establishments and the state. He also clearly denies the ultimate authority
science has come to portray. Should this enrage a few fanatics or even just passionate advocates
of science, Feyerabend’s characterization of science as hardly more than a myth that should be
taken with a grain of salt [04] will surely cause an even stronger reaction.
It does not take any significant amount of wisdom or intelligence for someone to know and
notice that science is, to put it somewhat plainly, a creature of habit. Procedures, models, rules
of conduct, etiquette, tradition: these are all integral parts of science, almost a spine that should
never be harmed or tampered with, lest the whole body that is science collapses and perishes.
It is all about method. Science not only relies on method but prides itself on following its
commandments. It is in this sense that Feyerabend is an “anarchist”, since his opposition to
method is obvious both in the titles and the content of his works.
“Science has done many things, but so have other ideologies. Science often
proceeds systematically, but so do other ideologies (just consult the records of the
many doctrinal debates that took place in the Church) and besides, there are no
overriding rules which are adhered to under any circumstances; there is no
"scientific methodology" that can be used to separate science from the rest.”
- Paul Feyerabend [05]
It is at this point that I would like to begin my main line of argumentation, and explain both
the title and the subtitle of this paper.
Feyerabend seems to go against science, but he doesn’t deny its usefulness or the role it
should play in society. He just proposes an adjustment of power, influence and authority. He,
much like Popper (even though he disagrees with the way he expresses his views) proposes
distancing oneself from the issue at hand. In this case it is science itself, instead of research or
theory formulation on a more specific, personal level.
Unabashedly serving the purposes of my argument, I will interpret Feyerabend’s views as an
appeal for one to stop saying “yes” to science and its absolute authority. It is in this
denouncement of the almighty establishment that one can see him supporting and advocating
abnegation in the more general sense.
The point I’m trying to get across is this: one can simply not call oneself an inquisitive,
critical and wise individual when one subscribes to an ideology with fervor that blinds one’s
judgment and restricts one’s freedom of thought, speech or creativity. In my opinion, in order to
be a good scientist, one must stop saying “yes”; one must distance oneself from both one’s own
self and the subject of one’s study. In this sense, it is this denial of the self and the respected
ideology that will allow one to become a more complete individual and more effective at what
one deals with. It is by gaining as much distance from our object (or subject) of study as
possible that we can truly investigate and analyze it in depth and gain significant knowledge in
the process.
This might seem obvious or a given to some; I do, however, believe the irony will not escape
the keen observer that’s prone to philosophizing and entertaining different theories. To offer a
more poetic analogy, we always hurt the ones we love, and the ones we love will inadvertently,
yet most definitely hurt us. Trust is a valued principle, and in personal relationships one must be
able to open themselves to it, but when attempting to be objective, one has to learn to trust no
one; including oneself.
Maintaining an Objective Humanity
Objectivity and truth are highly sought-after values, especially in the scientific community.
Objectivity leads to a more structured and impersonal way of thinking, which in turn leads that
much closer to the truth; or so it should be.
According to Feyerabend [06], Thomas Samuel Kuhn, an American historian and philosopher
(also one of Popper’s main adversaries) had one thing right: objectivity that relies on falsifiability
is not possible, nor sensible, in an establishment created and governed by humans, subjective
beings by nature. I find myself in complete agreement with this and it is also the reason I find
the definition of “objective” as “not dependent on the mind for existence” absurd, to say the
least. Our reality is shaped through the perception of the world around us using our senses, and
using our minds to either deduce or induce conclusions.
Feyerabend, however, finds himself in agreement with Popper once more regarding the fact
that true science takes place in the extraordinary, and not in “normal” science, as Kuhn
advocates. “Was there ever a period of normal science in the history of thought? No-and I challenge anyone to
prove the contrary.” - he retorts. [07]
How can one ever reach the truth without revolutions? Change is the mother of all evolution,
and thus a necessity, and a law. Rigid ideas and narrow-minded individuals are what hold
progress back. They are the ones that are not being honest to themselves or others. In the
archaic (and arguably, original) sense of “true”, they do not subscribe to the truth, no matter
how much they claim to desire to discover it. Having established that, since absolutism and
blind denial of alternate possibilities or theories is not the way to achieve objectivity, what
would the proposed alternative be?
Feyerabend’s views all point to a condition which I will characterize as “objective
humanity”. Objectivity on a personal, individual level is well nigh impossible and the
substitution of one oppressive ideology for another is unwise and dangerous. What the world
needs is more freedom of thought and less competition between ideologies and their advocates.
The ability for several different theories to co-exist opens up a new world of possibilities and
encourages critical thinking as well as the escape from harmful metanarratives. Feyerabend’s
views are accommodating, allowing different points of view and welcoming change and
addition to the present body of knowledge. After all, science is, etymologically, a true synonym
to knowledge (from the Latin scientia). It is the obsession with the additions that were forced
onto the concept (procedures, methodology, social segregation due to competing viewpoints)
that detached it from its original meaning.
To summarize, an objective humanity can only be attained by allowing several theories to
co-exist and for the status quo to be constantly challenged. The definition of “objective” has to
be rethought not by just many people agreeing on something (which seems to be the case with
science today) but by being mature, open-minded and inquisitive enough to agree to disagree
and explore alternatives to our own beliefs.
Conclusions
While most intellectuals will argue that they value freedom (especially freedom of thought)
more than anything and that they are independent thinkers, the truth is that if they subscribe to
some philosophical movement or to a specific part of an ideology they are automatically setting
limits for themselves.
The human mind enjoys freedom until a certain point; having no limits would in turn mean
having no structure to this world, which would result in absolute chaos. Psychologically,
humans enjoy having limits, because they give them a sense of security and order. It is in this
sense that “thinking outside the box” can be unsettling, so living outside the box and acting in
such a manner is even more daunting and uncomfortable for most. It is, however, necessary
when a revolution is required for advancement.
What I propose is that scientists need to open their minds to the possibility that there is no
universal, all-encompassing truth that explains our existence and what it entails. Perhaps there
is no “theory of everything”. Bearing that in mind, there is no way there is just one way of
thinking, one ideology, one philosophy that will be the one and only way to lead us to the truth.
As humans, the only thing we can claim is rightfully ours is our own thought and spirit, and
so our most valued possession is the thoughts we create and the mental processes that allow us
to advance and evolve both as a society and a species. Therefore we cannot restrict this creative
thinking; by doing so, we hinder our progress. By denying ourselves the comfort of conformity
and by questioning the principles, “facts” and ideologies we are spoon-fed from our childhood
and throughout our adult lives, we allow ourselves to grow intellectually and in turn offer more
to this world than we would through more conventional means.
The trick to not fall into the trap of absolutism, as stated before, is to stop saying “yes”. Stop
saying it blindly to any “fact” you are presented with. Stop saying it according to your own
belief system or feelings; but most importantly, stop saying it to yourself. This is both the irony
and the beauty of abnegation. Intellectual freedom.
On a microscopic level, embracing abnegation as a scientist would allow one to gain the
desired distance both from oneself and from the object of their study, thus bringing them closer
to the ideal notion of objectivity that is so well-respected in the scientific community.
Psychologically, I can imagine it would have a positive effect as well as they would not need to
feel anxious about breaking some rule that science commands or about living up to some
impossible standards a collective of supposedly superior individuals has set for them. In so
doing, it would help them perform better, actually enjoy what they are working on for what it is
and not for some Damoclean sword hanging over their head, called “responsibility”, “formal
method”, “scientific community” or anything of the sort.
On a macroscopic level, if abnegation was encouraged and critical thinking was cultivated
from a very young age in the educational system (as Feyerabend believes it should be [08]) and
further enforced in university and post-graduate education, the results would be equally
beneficial. A more flexible, open minded scientific community that opens itself up to different
disciplines and is attempts to reverse the social segregation it has established would be one that
would really make a difference in our world. Another result of embracing abnegation on the
more general level would be greater transparency of scientific procedures and research. This
transparency would not only educate the public about the scientific advances more reliably and
efficiently; it would also encourage external input and so the definition of “multidisciplinary
practices” would broaden and encompass more fields and different bodies of knowledge.
The reader might think that my audacity for being so certain about the ideas I’m proposing is
beyond words, and he or she might be right. Unlike the brilliant minds of philosophy,
philosophy of science in particular, I am not nearly wise or knowledgeable enough to offer
maxims or rules. Not unlike them, I offer a list of what I consider essential to being a good
scientist.
How to be a good scientist:
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
Stop saying “yes”.
Think. Question. Believe. Repeat.
Seek discomfort in your own ideas.
Open your mind to alternative views.
Become part of the system, then change it.
Learn the rules. Adapt at will.
Work towards an objective humanity.
Do not subscribe to universal truths.
Realize that perfection does not exist.
Strive for it nonetheless.
Needless to say, these are all highly subjective views and should be taken with a grain of salt.
All I am doing is adding to the pool of different views, theories and beliefs, hopefully making a
positive -if perhaps minor- contribution. Should anyone be interested in any of the discussed
issues, I encourage dialogue and would be greatly interested to see if this creates any ripples
and inspires others to express their views.
Now, if you will excuse me, I will go and think about all the different ways I’m wrong about
everything I wrote, and start doubting myself. After all, if I don’t follow my own advice, then
who will?
...
I just got stuck in a perpetual loop, didn’t I.
References / Bibliography
References
p. ##, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”, Karl Popper
[01]
from “Philosophy of Science – The Central Issues”
[02]
p. xxiv, “The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge”, Jean François Lyotard
[03]
p. vii,viii, “Against Method”, Paul Feyerabend
[04-08]
“How to Defend Society Against Science”, Paul Feyerabend
Bibliography
- “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”, Karl Popper
- “Logic Of Discovery or Psychology Of Research?”, Thomas S. Kuhn
from “Philosophy of Science – The Central Issues”, M. Curd / J.A. Cover, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998
- “The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge”, Jean François Lyotard
Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1984
- “Against Method”, Paul Feyerabend
Verso, 3rd edition (September 1993)
- “How to Defend Society Against Science”, Paul Feyerabend
http://www.calpoly.edu/~fotoole/321.1/feyer.html, 2009/10/18
Resources
- Definitions from Mac OS X 10.6 “Dictionary Application”
based on The New Oxford American Dictionary
- Microscope image from stock image website SXC.hu
http://www.sxc.hu/photo/860975